Instability of Equilibria in Experimental Markets: Upward-Sloping Demands, Externalities, and Fad-Like Incentives by Plott, Charles R. & Smith, Jared
Instability of Equilibria in Experimental Markets: Upward-Sloping Demands, Externalities, and
Fad-Like Incentives
Author(s): Charles R. Plott and Jared Smith
Source: Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Jan., 1999), pp. 405-426
Published by: Southern Economic Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1060807 .
Accessed: 24/02/2014 19:38
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
Southern Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Southern Economic Journal.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 19:38:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Southern Economic Journal 1999, 65(3), 405-426 
Instability of Equilibria in Experimental 
Markets: Upward-Sloping Demands, 
Externalities, and Fad-Like Incentives 
Charles R. Plott* and Jared Smitht 
The objective of the paper is to study markets in which the value of the activity to any one 
person increases with the level with which the activity is undertaken by others. The general 
interpretation could be fads, mimicking behavior, or some sort of belief formation process in 
which the beliefs or expectations of agents about some underlying state of nature are influenced 
by the buying behavior of other agents. The result is to create a market that can be modeled 
as having an upward-sloping market demand curve. The questions posed are (i) in the fad-like 
environment, does the classical concept of equilibrium (as an equating of market demand and 
market supply) accurately predict market behavior; (ii) can both stable and unstable equilibria 
be observed; and (iii) which of the two classical concepts of stability best describes the con- 
ditions under which instability is observed? Under the conditions of a fad-like demand side 
externality in a market organized by the multiple unit double auction (MUDA), market equil- 
ibration occurs at a point where demand equals supply. The disequilibrium behavior follows 
the dynamics of the Marshallian model of dynamics, as opposed to the Walrasian model. These 
results confirm and extend the major findings of Plott and George who studied a similar en- 
vironment with a downward-sloping supply. 
1. Introduction 
This paper addresses four questions: (i) Can an upward-sloping demand be successfully 
created in a laboratory environment through the introduction of an externality, similar to fad- 
like preferences? (ii) In the presence of such special characteristics, do markets equilibrate to 
the classical intersection of the demand and supply curves? (iii) Can both stable and unstable 
equilibria be observed? This is a rather deep question since it asks if markets obey laws of 
dynamics similar to those that have been observed in physics. (iv) If markets do exhibit insta- 
bility, which of the two classical concepts of stability, Marshallian stability or Walrasian sta- 
bility, does the best job of predicting the conditions under which instability will be observed? 
Both of these theories are based on very general models of market behavior and so should 
apply to the simple and special case of an experimental setting. Indeed, the theories should 
apply to an experimental setting with the same force that would be applied to any other setting. 
Thus, experimental methods are a perfect way to address the issues, especially when no alter- 
native method seems to exist. 
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The questions posed are natural. First, a fundamental part of neoclassical theory of market 
adjustments resides in the presumption that markets can be unstable. Thus, there is a natural 
intellectual curiosity about whether or not the presumption is correct. Second, there is a practical 
motivation for an interest in stability. Multiple equilibria often appear in models, causing dif- 
ficulty with model specification. The conventional solution to the problem is to discard the 
equilibria that are unstable under the presumption that unstable equilibria cannot be observed, 
that is, they are removed from all consideration. It is only natural to ask if this convention is 
justified. The third question stems from an issue about the relationship between the competitive 
model of markets and game theory. The most basic principles of economics are being replaced 
by principles of game theory and related solution concepts. Do phenomena exist in markets 
that will be very difficult if not impossible to capture with the static solution concepts of game 
theory? In particular, game theory and the associated concepts of solutions tend to be equilib- 
rium theories, without any accompanying notion of dynamics or equilibration. Thus, since dis- 
equilibrium is a primary feature of instability, it is a rather obvious place to look for challenges 
to the static equilibrium concepts of game theory. 
Notice that the motivations for this study are essentially unrelated to parameters that might 
be found in the U.S. economy, or any other economy, for that matter. The motivations are not 
about the economy; they are about economics and the underlying principles of economics that 
we use as tools to understand the economy. At this stage, the investigation is strictly of a 
laboratory nature. While the study suggests many interesting questions about the nature of 
markets found in the field, they are not addressed here. For example, the question of the relative 
frequency or instances of instability are not addressed. Measures that might indicate when a 
market is perched at an unstable equilibrium are not sought. This study is about the nature of 
the laws that govern whether or not an equilibrium is stable, and the focus is on the behavior 
of markets in the laboratory. 
Once one decides to look for instability, the neoclassical theory itself suggests where to 
search. According to the ideas, the curves must have a perverse shape in the sense that the 
demand curve should slope upward or the supply curve should slope downward. Neoclassical 
theory also suggests two types of underlying economic circumstances that can produce such 
perversities. One set of circumstances is related to income effects. Both the famous Giffen good 
of upward-sloping demands and the labor-leisure tradeoff that produces backward-bending 
(downward-sloping) supply curves are related to the income effect. A second set of circum- 
stances is related to externalities or external economies, as Marshall called them. On the supply 
side, downward-sloping supplies are thought to be produced by efficiencies that might be pro- 
duced by expanding industrial scale. On the demand side, a similarly constituted externality can 
produce the upward-sloping demand curves that are thought to be produced by preferences such 
as desires to mimic the behavior of others. 
This paper employs the second set of circumstances, the use of externalities to create an 
upward-sloping demand.1 Markets were created in which the value of the units to any one 
person increased with the level with which the units are purchased by others. The more others 
do it, the more any particular individual wanted to do it. The general interpretation could be 
preferences that result in a desire to mimic others or it could be some sort of belief formation 
process in which the beliefs or expectations of agents about some underlying state of nature 
'Experimental studies of externalities in markets have reported that the competitive model works exactly as expected. 
(See Plott 1983; Harrison et al. 1987.) 
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are influenced by the buying behavior of other agents. The result of the preference inducement 
was to create a market that can be modeled as having an upward-sloping market demand curve 
even though individual demand curves are downward sloping. With such a demand, an oppor- 
tunity arose to observe whether or not instability presents itself. 
Based on previous research, a presumption exists that Marshallian stability and not Wal- 
rasian stability will be observed. Plott and George (1992) studied markets in which the supply 
was downward sloping due to a Marshallian externality and found that the Marshallian model 
of market stability provided the appropriate conditions under which instability could be ob- 
served. The Walrasian concept of stability was found to be completely inappropriate for that 
type of economic environment. Since an upward-sloping demand is a mirror image of the 
Marshallian downward-sloping supply, the current study is a test of both the replicability and 
the robustness of the Plott and George experimental results. 
The results are easy to summarize. Unstable equilibria can exist in markets. They exist at 
the intersection of demand and supply, as do other classical market equilibria. Where the per- 
verse curves are due to an externality, the Marshallian model and not the Walrasian model 
define the conditions under which unstable equilibria exist. The experiments replicate and extend 
the results previously reported by Plott and George. 
Aside from classical discussions, the literature about the possibility of upward-sloping 
demands is not extensive. Papers by Becker (1991) and Karni and Levin (1994) both addressed 
issues of fad-like preferences. (For brevity, we will refer to them as B&KL.) Interestingly 
enough, both sets of authors, B&KL, failed to realize that they were dealing with a classical 
Marshallian external economy on the demand side as opposed to the supply side. After trans- 
lation to the demand side, the model of B&KL differs from Marshall and Plott and George 
(1992) (PG) in only two substantive respects. The first is the structure of the externality and 
the second is the assumed industrial organization. 
First, with respect to the structure of the externality, B&KL do not require that the level 
of market activity be the vehicle that carries the externality, as do Marshall and PG. Instead, 
B&KL fads allow market demand to be the vehicle of the externality independent of whether 
or not the demand resulted in trades or whether adequate supply exists. By contrast, the formal 
representation of the externality used in PG depends on actual volume traded in the market 
(Marshallian fads). In B&KL fads, the utilities of agents depended on the number of people 
that want to do something rather than the incidence of them actually doing it, as is the case in 
Marshall fads and in PG. 
Second, with respect to the industrial organization, B&KL assume that there are only a 
small number of well-informed sellers and many myopic buyers. By contrast, Marshall and PG 
assume that there is symmetry between the buying and selling sides of the market. The impli- 
cations of these differences are rather dramatic. Marshall and PG apply the competitive model 
on the one hand and with it can characterize notions of stable and unstable markets together 
with possible dynamic adjustment processes. By contrast, B&KL allow the demand side to 
behave much like competitors, from which a demand function can be derived in the same way 
that it is derived in this paper. However, that is where the similarity ends. In this paper, the 
supply is also derived by application of the competitive model. In B&KL, the sellers are fully 
informed of the behavior of the demand side of the market and are able to solve for various 
equilibria using standard game theoretic logic. The problem posed by B&KL is then one of 
selecting the appropriate equilibrium by appeal to solution concepts. 
While both sets of authors, B&KL, mention stability, they do not use the term in a classical 
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sense. In fact, it is interesting to note that, to the extent that the term stability makes sense, 
they identify instability with Walras and not Marshall. Thus, as the data reported in this paper 
show, the intuitive ideas of instability that they apply are exactly the opposite of what they 
should use. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is a review of the two competing 
models of market adjustment, Marshallian and Walrasian. This section is also used to introduce 
the major features of the experimental design. Sections 3 and 4 are brief summaries of the 
formal structure of the externality model and the associated concepts of demand and equilibrium 
from the point of view of the individual and the market, respectively. Section 5 is a discussion 
of the market supply functions. Section 6 is an outline of the experimental design and the 
predictions of the models, given the parameters imposed. Section 7 discusses experimental 
procedures. Section 8 contains the experimental results. The final section is a summary of the 
conclusions. An appendix contains forms and instructions. 
2. Marshall, Walras, and the Experimental Strategy 
Suppose the market is characterized by an upward-sloping demand such as drawn in Figure 
1, D1D1. This is only a crude approximation of the actual parameters that were induced in the 
experiment. Exactly how they were induced will be described in later sections. For now, the 
curve will be used to describe the difference between the Walrasian and the Marshallian models 
of market adjustment.2 Consider also the upward-sloping supply curve SISI. There are four 
potential equilibria, points a, b, c, and d. In addition, the actual intersection of the curves is 
not the behavioral intersection because of a transaction cost that is always observed in markets. 
Units for which there are exactly no gains from trade will not trade. Thus, a small gap exists 
between demand and supply at equilibrium. 
Let D(p) and S(p) be the quantities demanded and supplied at a particular price and let 
PD(q) and Ps(q) be the demand price and supply price, respectively, at some quantity q. The 
two models of adjustment are 
Walras: ap/at = F(D(p) - S(p)) 
Marshall: 8q/lt = G(PD(q) - Ps(q)). 
So the Walrasian model postulates that price adjusts with a speed dictated by the difference 
between quantity demanded and quantity supplied at the price. The theory is silent about quan- 
tity. The Marshallian model postulates that quantity adjusts with a speed dictated by the dif- 
ference between the demand price and the supply price evaluated at the quantity. The theory is 
silent about price. Both theories were developed on special "as if" assumptions about the nature 
of the adjustment process. For example, Marshall assumed a special trading in which the high 
valued and low cost units trade in sequence. Walras assumed the market was a tatonnemont 
system. These assumptions allow the theories of dynamics to proceed by observing only one 
of the variables (price or quantity) while neglecting the other. Of course, the derivative of both 
F and G is positive. 
2 Summaries of related ideas derived from classical and neoclassical discussions can be found in Henderson and Quandt 
(1980) and in Takayma (1974). 
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Figure 1. Market Demand DID, and Two Supply Functions SSi, and S2S2 
The substantial difference between the theories can be seen in Figure 1. Under supply 
conditions SISI, point b is stable according to the Marshallian model but is unstable under the 
Walrasian model, that is, if the price moves slightly upward, away from b, then according to 
the Walrasian model, demand is greater than supply so price continues to go up. On the other 
hand, if quantity increases slightly beyond point b, then according to the Marshallian model, 
the supply price is greater than demand price and the quantity will fall back to b. Point a is 
unstable under the Marshallian model, but it is stable according to Walras. Point c is Walras 
stable and Marshallian unstable. Point d is stable according to both models. Thus, the models 
give essentially opposite behavioral predictions. 
Now, consider the supply curve S2S2. Points a', b, and c are equilibria. However, now the 
stability properties are reversed. Point b is stable according to the Walrasian model (a' and c 
are unstable) while point b is unstable according to Marshall (a' and c are stable). Again, the 
models give essentially opposite behavioral predictions. 
The single demand curve DID,, shown in Figure 1, and the two supply curves demonstrate 
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the logic of the experimental design. By beginning with SIS1 parameters, it is possible to dis- 
cover whether or not the system moves toward one of the several equilibria. If it does, then we 
will know that the equilibrium of the demand and supply model captures market tendencies and 
the first two questions will be answered. Then, after the market equilibrates, a supply shift to 
2S2 will make the equilibrium unstable according to the dynamics of the model that got it 
there, if indeed such laws of dynamics are operative. An equilibrium that was previously stable, 
presumably, has now become unstable. If the market then moves away from the equilibrium to 
which it had previously converged, then we have answers to questions iii and iv. 
A possibility exists that market activity will stay at an unstable equilibrium because it is 
never perturbed away far enough to cause the underlying instability to become operative. After 
the shift in supply function, the market activity could simply stay at the equilibrium even though 
it has become unstable. To deal with this possibility the experimental design called for a push 
to the market. The dynamic model theoretically requires only a small push, but since we have 
no theory of what might be small, the plan called for something rather dramatic. If, after the 
shift, the market did not move, the demand would be shifted to D2D2 in Figure 2. The method 
of accomplishing this will be discussed in later sections. Briefly summarized, the trick was to 
allow each subject to operate "as if" the volume of others was at least 15 units; that is, even 
if the volume of others was less than 15, the subject's payoff was made as if the volume of 
others was 15. If volume of others was more than 15, then the subject's payment was based on 
the actual volume. As will be made clear below, the incentives were conditioned on the volume 
of others (an externality), and the resulting guarantee produced a normal downward-sloping 
demand up to 15 units of others because there was no externality. Beyond 15, the externality 
existed so the upward-sloping character was again present. Figure 2 displays D2D2 in the pres- 
ence of the supply curve S2S2 because this was the supply condition during the only time that 
the change in parameters was deployed. Under conditions S2S2 and D2D2, the only equilibrium 
is c, which is stable according to Marshallian principles of dynamics but is unstable according 
to Walrasian principles of dynamics. 
3. Underlying Theory of Demand and Individual Incentives 
The upward-sloping demand curve is the result of an externality. Each individual buyer 
makes decisions about one's own consumption based on prices and based on expectations about 
the decisions of others. In terms of the general theory, this relationship is captured by a utility 
function of the form U(xi,xi_), where xi is own consumption and x_i is the consumption of 
others. Since the consumption of others may not be known at the time of decision, a distinction 
is made between x_i and xei, where xe i represents the beliefs of i about the consumption activ- 
ities of others. Of course, the beliefs could be represented by a probability distribution, but for 
purposes of these theories, the decision under uncertainty takes a very specialized form. 
In a competitive model, each individual attempts to maximize U(xi, x_i) by choosing xi 
subject to the budget constraint and the beliefs about the activities of others. Given the special 
forms of beliefs, the problem becomes an attempt to maximize U(xi, Xe,) subject to the budget 
constraint. As will be made clear in subsequent discussions, the equilibrium of the system will 
be defined by a rational expectations axiom that requires that all expectations about the behavior 
of others are accurate; that is, in equilibrium, the rational expectations requirement will be that 
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Figure 2. Market Demand Function D,D, and Market Supply Function 
xe i = X-i E Xj 
j#i 
From an experimental design perspective, the most complicated aspect of individual in- 
centives is the determination of redemption values for buyers because of the externality and 
resulting fad-like incentives. As any one agent buys more, the marginal value of units to other 
agents increases. The models of the experimental situation assume that agents prefer more 
money to less and that money is the only thing that the agents care about; that is, where mi is 
the amount of money earned by the subject in a given period of the experiment, the incentives 
on which the model is based are captured by the function Ui(m). If the individual faces a 
competitive market price P, then the money income of agent i is of the form 
mi = Ri(xi, xi) - Pxl, (1) 
where the function Ri(xi, x_i) is the redemption value that the buyer receives from the experi- 
menter. 
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The specific functional form used in the experiments is 
Ri(xi, x_i) = aixi - bxi22 + Cix'X-i, (2) 
where a, b, and c are constants that are determined by the experimenter. However, from an 
experimental point of view, the key functions are the marginals of redemption values in terms 
of the individual controls; that is, 
aRi(xi, x_,)/lxi = a, - bixi + cix_i. (3) 
Equation 3 is the basis of the incentive charts for buyers contained in the appendix. The 
experiment employed three different agent buyer types, and there were two subjects for each 
type. All buyers had identical parameters b and c, with b = 16 and c = 8. The ai parameter 
differed according to type, with the value of a e {132, 136, 140}. In the table, the units of m 
are in francs and each franc is converted at a rate of 0.24 dollars per franc for buyers and 0.01 
dollars per franc for sellers. 
An approximation of this function is shown in Figure 3 for individual 0. Shown here are 
the marginal redemption values for various units given that the volume of others is 5, 10, 15, 
and 20, respectively. As can be seen, the redemption values for the individual decrease as units 
purchased increase, given that the purchases of others are constant. However, if purchases of 
others go up, then the marginal values for this individual go up. Shown also in the figure is 
the market demand for this individual. It will be explained in the next section. 
4. Underlying Theory of Demand and Market Parameters 
Since all buyers and sellers were in essence given interest-free loans for the duration of a 
period, they have no budget constraint. In this case, the maximization hypothesis dictates that 
the buyers will behave as if they were attempting to satisfy the equation aU(mi(xi, xei))/axi = 
0. Since utility is assumed to be monotone in money earnings, the hypothesis is that the indi- 
vidual attempts to maximize money income given the beliefs about the transactions of others; 
that is, the variable x_i is replaced by a different variable xei in the model of the individual's 
decisions. From Equations 1, 2, and the hypothesis about beliefs, this becomes 
aU(mi(xi, xe,))/Axi = ai - b,x, + cxei - P = 0 (4) 
or, using Equation 3, it becomes an implicit market demand equation for the individual, 
aRi(xi, xei)/lxi = ai - b.x, + Cixei = P. (5) 
By solving for xi in terms of P and xei, Equation 5 becomes the amounts the individual 
would want to purchase expressed as a function of prices and their beliefs about the purchases 
of others. 
Figure 3 contains a graph of the demand function implicit in Equation 5 for individual 0, 
given beliefs about the transactions of others. If the other individuals purchase five units and if 
the price is 155 francs, then this individual would want to purchase one unit. If the price was 
179 francs and if others purchased 10 units, then this individual would want to purchase 2 units. 
If the price was 203 francs and if others purchased 15 units, then this individual would want 
to purchase 3 units. Thus, one can obtain an intuition of how a market demand might have an 
upward slope if increasing prices were associated with more purchases by others. 
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The simultaneous relationship between prices and purchases of others is used by the com- 
petitive model to produce the upward-sloping demand. The theory requires that, for a price and 
quantity to be an equilibrium on the demand side of the market, each individual is optimizing 
given the price; that is, Equation 5 must be satisfied for each individual. Second, the theory 
requires that the expected sales of others equals the actual sales. No buyer is surprised by what 
other buyers do. This is a type of rational expectations axiom. In particular 
Xei = X-i = X. 
j#i 
(6) 
Equation 5 is the vehicle that ties expected transactions to the actual transactions of the 
individual. Equation 6 ties the beliefs of the individual about the behavior of others to the actual 
behavior of others. Specifically, it requires that the beliefs are accurate. 
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Substituting the parameters for the experiment and solving the resulting expressions of 
Equations 5 and 6 yields a continuous approximation of market demand. The calculations for 
both DID, and D2D2 are shown in Table 1. For example, for D,D1, the parameters are {132, 
136, 140} for the values of ai for each of the types. There are two agents of each type yielding 
a total of six agents on the demand side. The values of b and c are the same for all agents and 
are, respectively, 16 and 8. Substituting and solving the resulting market demand function thus 
derived is approximately 
P = 4X + 136. (7) 
Notice that the demand function has a positive slope. The computations in the table differ 
slightly due to the discrete nature of the units that compose the table. 
5. Market Supply 
Parameters supporting two different supply functions are utilized in the experiments. These 
are seen as SIS, and S2S2 in Figure 1. The numerical parameters are contained in Table 1. These 
curves were induced using standard procedures. An example of a seller's cost sheet is contained 
in the appendix. As will be explained in the next section, these two different supply functions 
imply different stability properties when market demand is DID,. 
6. Experimental Design and Model Predictions 
The experimental design called for the market to first contain the demand parameters DID, 
and the supply parameters SIS,. These parameters were to stay in place for period 0 through 
period 8. Pilots and previous experiments suggested that this was sufficient time to give the 
system an opportunity to equilibrate at one of the several equilibria. In period 9, the supply 
curve was shifted to S2S2. The demand curve would remain unchanged at DID, and the supply 
shift would be implemented in a manner that was undetected by the demand side of the market. 
The effect of this shift in supply would be to reverse the stability properties of all of the 
equilibria according to both theories. Thus, all stable equilibria according to a given theory 
would become unstable according to that theory and all unstable equlibria would become stable 
(with some exceptions at the extreme and boundaries). Thus, if markets have elements of the 
dynamics captured by either of the two theories, then prices and quantities would move away 
from the equilibrium to which they had previously converged, and this to and fro behavior 
would isolate the nature of the dynamics involved. If no movement took place, if the prices 
and quantities remained at a possible unstable equilibrium, then the design called for the im- 
plementation of demand curve D2D2. This shift in demand would provide a push that could 
further test the dynamics. 
The equilibria under the various conditions are listed in Table 2. As can be seen, with the 
exception of the outermost equilibrium under conditions S,SI, all equilibria have opposing sta- 
bility properties depending on the theory applied. And, after the supply shift, the stability 
properties are reversed. 
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Table 1. Induced Market Demands and Market Supplies 
D2D2(q) with 
Quantity D,D,(q) S,SI(q) S2S2(q) Guarantee 
1 139 119 157 243 
2 139 123 159 243 
3 143 127 161 239 
4 147 131 163 239 
5 151 135 165 235 
6 155 139 167 235 
7 159 143 169 227 
8 163 147 171 227 
9 167 151 173 223 
10 171 159 175 223 
11 175 167 177 219 
12 179 175 179 219 
13 183 183 181 211 
14 187 191 183 201 
15 191 199 184 207 
16 195 207 185 207 
17 199 215 186 203 
18 203 223 187 203 
19 207 229 188 211 
20 211 231 189 211 
21 215 233 191 219 
22 219 235 194 229 
23 223 237 198 227 
24 227 239 203 227 
25 231 241 209 235 
26 235 243 215 235 
27 239 245 221 243 
28 243 247 231 243 
29 247 249 239 251 
30 251 251 247 251 
31 255 253 255 259 
32 259 255 263 259 
33 263 257 271 267 
34 267 259 279 267 
35 271 261 287 275 
36 275 263 295 275 
37 279 265 303 283 
38 283 267 311 283 
39 283 269 319 275 
40 275 271 327 275 
41 275 273 335 273 
42 273 275 343 273 
43 273 277 351 271 
44 271 279 359 271 
45 271 281 367 259 
46 259 283 375 259 
47 259 285 383 255 
48 255 287 391 255 
49 255 289 399 
50 291 407 
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Table 2. Equilibria (P, q) and Stability Properties: Walrasian, Marshallian, Stable and Unstable 
Supply Conditions 
Supply Conditions Supply Conditions S2S2 with Demand 
SiS, S2S2 Guaranteed Volume 
Point Point Point 
on on on 
Figure Stability Figure Stability Figure Stability 
1 P, q Properties 1 P, q Properties 1 P, q Properties 
a 119, 0 Walras stable a' 154, 0 Marshallian sta- 
ble 
b 176, 12 Walras unstable, b 176, 12 Walras stable, 
Marshallian Marshallian 
stable unstable 
c 248, 30 Walras stable, c 248, 30 Walras unstable, c 248, 30 Walras unstable, 
Marshallian Marshallian Marshallian 
unstable stable stable 
d 273, 40 Walras stable, 
Marshallian 
stable 
7. Experimental Procedures 
A total of three experiments was conducted plus pilot experiments. These are indexed by 
the dates on which the experiments were conducted (021592, 022292, and 030292). Subjects 
were students at the California Institute of Technology who were recruited for the experiment 
and were told that they would be paid. The instructions were read to the subjects. Afterward, 
the markets were opened through a computerized market in the Caltech Laboratory for Exper- 
imental Economics and Political Science. All markets were organized as computerized multiple 
unit double auctions (MUDA), as described in Plott (1991). Subjects were trained to use the 
computer in electronic markets through the software tutorial programs contained in the general 
MUDA package. The incentive charts were organized3 such that it is reasonable to assume that 
the fact that the market demand function was stationary over all periods was public information. 
The incentive charts of suppliers were such that the supply curve shift could not have been 
detected by the demand side of the market until it was possibly revealed through the behavior 
of the market itself.4 
Two of the experiments (022292) and (030292) were conducted exactly according to plan, 
but a mistake made by one of the suppliers in the third experiment (021592) prevents a direct 
comparison of small parts of the data with the other two experiments. The data from the third 
experiment are analyzed separately in the overall analysis because this experiment reveals an 
interesting phenomenon that is discussed independently. While the numbers of experiments may 
seem small, there are still a large number of observations because of the design. Each experiment 
involved parameter shifts, which can be viewed as additional experiments. The dynamic results 
are strong. The results closely conform to the results of Plott and George. Without a clear idea 
of what could be learned from additional experiments, the decision was made to stop with the 
three experiments. 
3 Physically, the charts were large and no new incentive charts were passed out. 
4 It was possible to shift the supply curve without new charts. The form of the charts was public information. 
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All experiments were conducted under the same format of parameters and parameter 
changes. The first nine periods (periods 0 through 8) were conducted under supply conditions 
S,Si. A shift in supply to S2S2 occurred before the opening of period 9 (which was really the 
10th period) and remained in place until the end of the experiment. In summary, the experi- 
mental conditions were as follows. 
Experiment 021592. Periods 0 through 8, supply SIS, was operative, and periods 6 and 7 
were skipped; Periods 9 through 19, supply S2S2 was operative. 
Experiment 022292. Periods 0 through 8, supply SIS, was operative; periods 9 through 
19, supply S2S2 was operative; a guarantee of the volume of others at 15 units was implemented 
at the start of period 15, thereby changing the demand curve to D2D2. 
Experiment 030292. Periods 0 through 8, supply S1S, was operative; periods 9 through 
18, supply S2S2 was operative. 
The different period structure of experiment 021592 reflected the misunderstanding by one 
subject seller. This seller thought that selling all units listed on the incentive sheet was necessary. 
Theoretically, this would be interpreted as a substantial shift to the right of S,S1 that moves all 
interior equilibria to the right. Of course, during the first periods, the high volume (e.g., 40 
units) was noticed by the experimenters. However, the possibility that a subject might be con- 
fused was not really considered by the experimenters at first. Instead, the experimenters thought 
that the market had found the stable equilibrium that exists at the point (40, 273). This particular 
equilibrium would have been very costly to the experimenters, and a decision was made to save 
money and eliminate periods 6 and 7. If the market was resting at that equilibrium, little was 
to be learned by letting it continue through the entire planned periods. The subjects were told 
that, due to a computer problem, periods 6 and 7 would be opened and then immediately closed 
without trade and that the subjects should simply mark out those periods on the incentive charts. 
They were told that the experiment would resume at period 8. Period 8 was chosen because it 
is one period before the parameter shift to the S2S2 supply curve. While periods 6 and 7 were 
being opened and closed, a spot check of subject records revealed the confused subject. Thus, 
before the beginning of period 8, the confusion was discovered and the subject was told that it 
was not necessary to sell everything. After this, the experiment proceeded as planned. Of course, 
all subjects had learned from the market in the first several periods that the market could sustain 
a high volume. In particular, the buyers, who did not know of the supply shift, were aware of 
the possibility. 
8. Results 
The time series from all three experiments are displayed in Figures 4-6. Shown on the 
horizontal axis is time in seconds. The vertical axis is price. The circles represent contracts. 
The vertical lines are the divisions between periods. The horizontal lines are the most important 
equilibria. The bottom of the figures contain average prices per period and volumes. 
The central conclusion summarized by the two formal result statements is that Marshallian 
stability, as opposed to Walrasian, is the appropriate model for environments like the one under 
study. The results are supported by the visual representation of the data. The time series from 
the two central experiments (022292 and 030292) are contained in Figures 4 and 5. In both 
experiments under S,S1, the time series reveals the convergence to the nearest stable Marshallian 
equilibrium point at (176, 12). This equilibrium is Walrasian unstable, but it is Marshallian 
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Figure 6. Contract Time Series Experiment 021592 
stable. The supply shift S2S2 that occurs in period 9 of both experiments is accompanied by a 
movement away from the old equilibrium (which is now Walrasian stable) toward one of the 
two neighboring stable Marshallian (unstable Walrasian) equilibria. In experiment 022292, the 
convergence is downward toward point a' at (154, 0), and in 030292, the convergence is upward 
toward point c at (248, 30). The data from experiment 021592 are in Figure 6. When the model 
is adjusted for the mistake of the seller at the first part of this experiment, a Marshallian stable 
equilibrium appears near point c. As can be seen, the data are converging toward this area. 
After shifts, the data fall away from the uppermost stable Marshallian equilibrium, through the 
stable Walrasian equilibrium, to the lower stable Marshallian equilibrium. Then the data return 
to the upper stable Marshallian equilibrium. 
RESULT 1. The law of supply and demand accurately predicts points of equilibration. 
SUPPORT. In both of the central experiments (022292) and (030292) under supply S1S1 
before a parameter shift (periods 0 through 8), the time series reveals the convergence to the 
nearest stable Marshallian (and unstable Walrasian) equilibrium point b at (176, 12). In exper- 
iment 02292, the volume is within 2 units of the equilibrium volume of 12 units for the periods 
2 through 8 and the average price is within 8 francs (less than 5%) of the equilibrium price of 
176 for periods 1 through 8 and within 3 francs (less than 2%) for periods 6, 7, and 8. In 
experiment 030292, the volume is within 2 units of the equilibrium volume of 12 units for 
periods 1 through 8 and the average price is within 5 francs (less than 3%) of 176 for periods 
2 through 8 and within 1 franc (less than 1%) for periods 7 and 8. 
After the supply shift to S2S2, the data in all three experiments converge toward one of the 
neighboring stable Marshallian (unstable Walrasian) equilibria. In experiment 022292, by period 
0 
0. 
i 
419 
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Table 3. Estimated Coefficients (t-Statistics) 
Marshallian Model Walrasian Model 
Q, - Q,- = a + b[P(Q,,) - P,(Q,-,)] P, - P,_, = a + b[D(P,_,) - S(P,_,)] 
a b R2 D, N a b R2 dw N 
021592 -1.04 -0.28 0.10 1.36 10 -1.02 0.52 0.01 0.92 10 
(-0.32) (-0.95) (-0.12) (0.28) 
022292 -1.28* 0.17* 0.35 2.34 17a -1.74 -1.39** 0.40 1.64 16a 
(-2.29) (2.85) (-1.38) (-3.07) 
030292 -0.93 0.24* 0.32 1.74 17 -6.84* -3.44** 0.47 1.39 17 
(-0.85) (2.65) (-2.20) (-3.62) 
The coefficients reported here were computed by OLS. Using Table 1, the theoretical demands and supplies were 
calculated as follows: For the Marshallian model, the observed quantity for the period was used to find the period's 
theoretical market demand and supply. The Walrasian model was operationalized in a similar fashion, using the average 
transaction price of the period (rounded to the nearest integer). For both market demand and supply, the maximum 
quantity for which the induced market demand or supply did not exceed the observed market price was used for D(P) 
and S(P), respectively. For clarity, an example is the following: For period 3 in experiment 022292, we have that the 
observed quantity is 14 and the rounded average price is 182, and for period 4 in experiment 022293 we have that the 
observed quantity is 12 and the rounded average price is 184. These data lead to the reexpressed data, which are used 
in the regressions reported above, of Q4 - Q3 = -2, P4 - P3 = 2, P(Q3) = 187, Ps(Q3) = 191, D(P3) = 12, and S(P3) 
= 12. 
a The number of observations differs for the two regressions on 022292 due to the absence of any transactions in period 
14. Thus, there is a total quantity but no average price. 
* Statistically distinct from 0 at 0.05 level. 
** Statistically distinct from 0 at 0.01 level. 
13, the average price and volume are (167, 3), and by period 14, the volume is zero, which is 
near the equilibrium point a' at (154, 0). After the demand shifts to D2D2, the data converge 
toward the equilibrium c at (248, 30). For the final three periods, the volume is within one unit 
and the average price is within 11%. During the final three periods of experiment 030292, the 
volume is within one unit and the average price is within 2% of the equilibrium point c. 
In experiment 021592, after the subject's misunderstanding was corrected, the volume is 
within two units for the final four periods, 16, 17, 18, and 19. The average price is within 5% 
of the equilibrium point c at (248, 30). QED. 
The next conclusion is that the Marshallian model, and not the Walrasian model, captures 
the nature of the equilibration process; that is, the dynamics are Marshallian and not Walrasian 
since the convergence is toward the Marshallian stable equilibrium points. 
RESULT 2. Price and quantity movements are in the direction predicted by the Marshallian 
model and not in the direction predicted by the Walrasian model. 
SUPPORT. Table 3 contains the estimates of the two dynamic models for experiments 
022292 and 030292. Estimates for experiments 022292 and 030292 are calculated separately 
for different sets of parameters. In Table 3, the estimate term for the Marshallian model bM is 
always positive. It is significant (95% confidence interval) for both 022292 and 030292. Thus, 
the data support the Marshallian model. Contrary to prediction of the Walrasian dynamic model, 
the adjustment term bw is negative for both 022292 and 030292. It is significant for both data 
sets. Thus, the Walrasian model can be rejected in favor of the Marshallian model. Pooled data 
yield even stronger support for the result. QED. 
The support for the Marshallian model is not all positive. The model predicts zero intercept 
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aM. However, as can be seen from Table 3, aM is systematically negative and significant (95% 
confidence interval for 022292). The next observations might help account for the inaccuracies. 
OBSERVATION. The dynamics of price adjustment have a memory. Information in the 
adjustment process is not simply local information of the recent past. 
SUPPORT. The support for this observation comes from experiment 021592 in which a 
subject was confused for the first few periods. Notice in Figure 6 that the data start with high 
prices and volume due to the implicit change in parameters of the one supplier. This change, 
in essence, creates a stable equilibrium until period 8, when the confusion was removed. It is 
interesting to note that, during period 8, the market is resting at an unstable Marshallian equi- 
librium. When the shift occurs at period 9, the equilibrium becomes Marshallian stable and, 
during period 9, the market stays near the equilibrium. However, in order to get to the high- 
priced equilibrium, the market must move away from the stable Marshallian equilibrium of zero 
volume that exists at point a' on the boundary. The high-priced stable equilibrium is not sus- 
tained. A few data points that are movements away from the stable Marshallian equilibrium 
take the systems into the unstable ranges. The fall in prices and volume that occurs in periods 
10, 11, and 12 represents general movements toward the Marshallian stable boundary equilib- 
rium. Of course, the fact that any volume exists at all during these periods is in defiance of the 
dynamic pressures of the Marshallian model. The small volumes that occurred in periods 13 
and 14, when the market price falls to the lowest levels, are due to the buying behavior of a 
single agent. The action of one buyer constitutes 100% of the volume in periods 12, 13, and 
14. It is natural to assume that this buyer is trying to signal other buyers to get the volume up 
so the market volume would be like the profitable experiences during the first periods of the 
experiment at a volume of 30 units. The hint is then picked up by other buyers in period 15. 
The volume and price move through the stable Walrasian (Marshallian unstable) equilibrium at 
(176, 12) and continue to converge to the high level Marshallian stable equilibrium near (248, 
30). QED. 
This observation is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the 
dynamics of adjustment involve memories of a sort not captured by either the Marshallian or 
the Walrasian models of dynamics. Second, if game theory is to be successful, it must allow 
for the possibility that the selection of equilibrium can occur on either side of the market. The 
observation identifies a case in which the possibility of "leadership" instigated by a buyer 
resulted in equilibrium selection. By contrast, the literature (Becker 1991; Karni and Levin 1994) 
assumes that the selection in the case of fad-like preferences will come from sellers alone. It is 
rather interesting to note that even though these papers make solid contributions to the abstract 
understanding and anatomy of the economics of fad-like environments, their presumption about 
the market dynamics is wrong and their presumption about the application of game theory is 
wrong as well. Clearly, results such as those reported here are of interest to theory. 
9. Closing Remarks 
Markets with externalities and fad-like incentives exhibit many of the qualities predicted 
by the competitive law of supply and demand. Equilibria of the competitive model do a good 
job of capturing the points of price convergence. The power of the equilibrium model is rather 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.238 on Mon, 24 Feb 2014 19:38:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
422 Charles R. Plott and Jared Smith 
surprising since the demand curve construction requires very strong assumptions along the lines 
of rational expectations. Nevertheless, equilibration is observed. 
Markets with upward-sloping demands can contain both stable and unstable equilibria. If 
the upward slope is due to an externality like a Marshallian fad, then the conditions under which 
instability will be observed and the associated dynamics are best captured by the Marshallian 
concept of instability, as opposed to the Walrasian concept. The importance of the Marshallian 
concept seems to have been lost to the theoretical literature, which has focused on the Walrasian 
concept and on game theoretic selection models. These data suggest a need for theorists to 
revisit the classical Marshallian theory. 
The theoretical symmetry that exists between the upward-sloping demand and the down- 
ward-sloping supply exists in behavior. The results reported here replicate the discovery of Plott 
and George (1992) and extend the result to the upward-sloping demand. The properties of 
equilibration known to exist in the downward-sloping supply case of a Marshallian external 
economy exist with equal strength in the upward-sloping demand case of fad-like incentives. 
Thus, in these environments, the competitive market law of supply and demand appears to work 
with the generality for which it was developed. The conditions under which instability is ob- 
served are predicted by the Marshallian model of market adjustment and not the Walrasian 
model. A major outstanding issue is whether or not the Marshallian theory of stability holds in 
the backward-bending case. At this point, there appears to be no detailed theory of the dynamics. 
Indeed, one might note that the Walrasian model (with the wrong sign) yields higher R2 than 
the Marshallian model. Thus, the door is wide open for theoretical improvements. 
An error by a subject provided a glimpse at what could be one of the most important 
aspects of the study. The nature of market equilibrium selection is not determined by local 
information and dynamics alone. Collective experience, signaling through market actions, and 
coordinated efforts to overcome a "local" prisoner's dilemma may all play a part in the complex 
dynamics of equilibration. 
Appendix 
Instructional Material and Parameters 
Sellers were given standard instructions such as those found in Plott (1991). The only differences are the numbers 
used in the examples. Buyer instructions are special because of the nature of the externality. These are reproduced in this 
appendix. A quiz and a period zero were both administered to check subjects' understanding of the accounting system. 
The Redemption Sheets contain the parameters of buyers. These are important because slight adjustments from the 
continuous model were made in order to obtain the quantified incentives used in the experiment. In addition to a sheet 
with marginal redemption value information, buyers were given sheets with the total of redemption values. 
Specific Instructions to the Buyers 
During each market period, you are free to purchase as many units as you might want. The profit from each 
purchase (which is yours to keep) is computed by taking the difference between the redemption value and purchase price 
of the unit bought. Note that you may buy a unit for a price that exceeds the redemption value. Therefore, 
[your profit = (redemption value) - (purchase price)]. 
Your redemption value depends on your volume and the volume of others. This means that, when you buy units, 
you will not know your redemption values with certainty. Your redemption values will be known only at the end of 
a period when the total volume of purchases is known. Examine your Redemption Sheet. If the volume of others is 
zero, that is, you were the only one who bought units, then the redemption value of each of your units is found in 
the column labeled 0. If the volume of others is 23, then the redemption value of each of your units is found in the 
column labeled 23. 
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Suppose, for example, that you bought 2 units in a market in which a total of 10 units were bought. Find the 
appropriate column in your Example Redemption Sheet (as illustrated on the chalkboard). Since the volume of others is 
eight units, the redemption value for you of the first unit is 6000 and the redemption value of the second unit is 4500. 
If you bought each unit for 3500, your profit is 
profit from first unit = 6000 - 3500 = 2500 
profit from second unit = 4500 - 3500 = 1000 
total profit = 2500 + 1000 = 3500. 
The blanks on the Record of Purchases and Earnings will help you record your profit. The purchase price of the 
first unit you buy during the first period should be recorded in row 2. Do the same (in the appropriate rows) for any 
additional units bought in this period. At the end of the period, enter the market volume of the period in row A, enter 
your volume in row B, and subtract row B from row A to determine the resulting volume of others to enter in row C. 
Then look on your Redemption Sheet to find your unit redemption values. On the record of Purchases and Earning 
Sheets, enter the redemption value of the first unit in row 1. You should then record the profit on this sale as directed in 
row 3. After computing the profit for each unit bought, record the total profit for that period in the last row on the page, 
row 31. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly in the appropriate column (period 1 in column 1, period 2 in 
column 2, etc.). 
Quiz Sellers 
1. If in period 1, you sold two units for 1800 each, what would be your profit 
for the period ? 
Complete the form. 
2. If in period 2, you sold one unit for 1000 what would be your profit 
for the period ? 
Quiz Buyers 
1) If you bought one unit in a market in which six (6) units are purchased in total (your unit plus 
units purchased by others) 
a) What is the volume of others ? 
b) What is the redemption value of your second unit 
2) If you bought two units in a market in which no other units are purchased 
a) What is the volume of others ? 
b) What is the redemption value of your next unit 
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Buyer # 0 and 2 
Volume of Others 
0o 1 2 3 4 5 6 ... 32 
1st 124 140 146 152 158 164 180 ... 386 
2nd 108 124 130 136 142 148 164 ... 370 
3rd 92 108 114 120 126 132 148 ... 354 
4th 76 92 98 104 110 116 132 ... 338 
5th 60 76 82 88 94 100 116 ... 322 
6th 44 60 66 72 78 84 100 ... 306 
7th 28 44 50 56 62 68 84 ... 290 
8th 12 28 34 40 46 52 68 ... 274 
Redemption Sheet Buyer # 1 and 4 
Volume of Others 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ... 32 
1st 116 122 128 134 140 156 162 ... 368 
2nd 100 106 112 118 124 140 146 ... 352 
3rd 84 90 96 102 108 124 130 ... 336 
4th 68 74 80 86 92 108 114 ... 320 
5th 52 58 64 70 76 92 98 ... 304 
6th 36 42 48 54 60 76 82 ... 288 
7th 20 26 32 38 44 60 66 ... 272 
8th 4 10 16 22 28 44 50 ... 256 
Redemption Sheet Buyer # 3 and 5 
Volume of Others 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6... 32 
1st 120 126 132 148 154 160 166 ... 372 
2nd 104 110 116 132 138 144 150 ... 35 
3rd 88 94 100 116 122 128 134 ... 340 
4th 72 78 84 100 106 112 118 ... 324 
5th 56 62 68 84 90 96 102 ... 308 
6th 40 46 52 68 74 80 86 ... 292 
7th 24 30 36 52 58 64 70 ... 276 
8th 8 14 20 36 42 48 54 ... 260 
Note: as volume of others increases, 
redemption value increases by 6 per 
unit. The exceptions are every fifth 
unit starting at 1, at which point the 
increment is 16 as opposed to 6. 
Note: as volume of others increases, 
redemption value increases by 6 per 
unit. The exceptions are every fifth 
unit starting at 5, at which point the 
increment is 16 as opposed to 6. 
Note: as volume of others increases, 
redemption value increases by 6 per 
unit. The exceptions are every fifth 
unit starting at 3, at which point the 
increment is 16 as opposed to 6. 
Redemption Sheet 
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Seller unit cost in period 0-8 
Seller Number 
6 7 8 9 10 11 
1st 128 132 136 116 120 124 
2nd 140 144 148 156 164 172 
3rd 196 188 180 220 212 204 
4th 236 234 232 230 228 226 
5th 244 246 248 238 240 242 
6th 250 252 254 256 258 260 
7th 266 264 262 272 270 268 
8th 284 282 280 278 276 274 
9th 292 294 296 286 288 290 
10th 298 300 302 304 306 308 
Seller unit cost in period 9-20 
Seller Number 
6 7 8 9 10 11 
1st 160 162 164 154 156 158 
2nd 166 168 170 172 174 176 
3rd 181 180 178 184 183 182 
4th 200 195 191 188 186 185 
5th 228 236 244 206 212 218 
6th 252 260 268 276 284 292 
7th 316 308 300 340 332 324 
8th 388 380 372 364 356 348 
9th 420 420 436 396 404 412 
10th 444 452 460 468 476 484 
Record of Sales and Profits, Seller No. 6 
USit TradingPeiod 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Sold Number 
1 Selling Price 
1 2 Cost of 1st unit 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 160 160 
Profit 
(row 1 - row 2) 
4 Selling Price 
2 5 Cost of 2nd unit 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 166 166 
Profit 
(row 4 - row 5) 
28 Selling Price 
10 29 Cost of 10th unit 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 298 444 444 
30 Profit 
(row 28 - row 29) 
|31Totalperperiod I II II II II II II II II I 
Name Soc. Sec. No. Total Payment 
Address 
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